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14. ABSTRACT

Instructional material used in the Naval War College leads students to the conclusion that operational art and the operational level of war is a relatively recent development. Writers point to the development of progressively larger and more complex battlefields. They argue that general officers operated beyond the visual range of national leaders to achieve an integrated pursuit of national objectives. This "new" level of war began to emerge only in the pre-industrial age of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One could instead argue that the operational level of war is not a recent development in warfare, but one that has existed even in ancient times.

The Athenian campaign during the Peloponnesian War to conquer Sicily meets all the criteria used to describe the relationship between levels of war. It linked Athenian national strategy with tactical operations on the sea and ground. The size of the forces, the complex command and control structure, long lines of communication, and the fact that the force operated in a joint environment far from their national leadership all lead one to believe it was indeed an early example of the operational level of war and operational art.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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OPERATIONAL ART'S HISTORICAL ORIGINS
- THE SICILIAN CAMPAIGN OF 415-413 B.C. -

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 May 2004

Abstract

This paper focuses on the origins of operational art and the operational level of war. Instructional material used in the Naval War College leads students to the conclusion that operational art and the operational level of war is a relatively recent development. Writers point to the development of progressively larger and more complex battlefields. They argue that general officers operated beyond the visual range of national leaders to achieve an integrated pursuit of national objectives. This "new" level of war began to emerge only in the pre-industrial age of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. One could instead argue that the operational level of war is not a recent development in warfare, but one that has existed even in ancient times.

The operational level of war is older than described in the Naval War College course. The Athenian campaign during the Peloponnesian War to conquer Sicily meets all the criteria used to describe the relationship between levels of war. It linked Athenian national strategy with tactical operations on the sea and ground. The size of the forces, the complex command and control structure, long lines of communication, and the fact that the force operated in a joint environment far from their national leadership all lead one to believe it was indeed an early example of the operational level of war and operational art.

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INTRODUCTION

The origin of operational art is a question of debate among military academicians. Course material used for instruction in the Naval War College would lead students to the conclusion that operational art is a relatively recent development. They point to the development of progressively larger and more complex battlefields, national policy decisions, and the *explosion of military technology* as key to the emergence of the operational level of war.[1] Those authors argue that General officers operated beyond the visual range of national leaders to achieve an integrated pursuit of national objectives. This "new" level of war began to emerge only in the pre-industrial age of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These writers believe that skillful tactics and a sound, coherent strategy were the key requirements until the nineteenth century.[2] Some writers point to the increased role of science, industrialization and social changes that led to "theater war." Other writers point to the industrial age as the genesis of operational art.[3] Others contend that the "undistributed, pre-operational army had only to integrate actions with itself."[4] One proposed the emergence of operational art was a recent development to the point of stating that the ideas of simultaneous and successive operations were alien to Napoleon and the centuries of generals preceding him. Instead of taking this view of the historical aspects of operational art, one could instead argue that the operational level of war is not a recent development in warfare, but one that has existed even in ancient times.

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[1]Captain Anthony Ruoti, The Joint Military Operations Department Syllabus and Study Guide for Joint Military Operations 2004*," Naval* War College, College of Naval Warfare, (Newport Naval Station, RI, n.d.), 25.

[2] Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, Naval War College, NWC 1004, (Newport Naval Station, RI: 2000), 1.

[3] Colonel Michael R Matheny, The Roots of Modern Operational Art, U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, NWC 2031, (Army War College, Carlisle, PA, n.d.), 1.

[4] James L. Schneider, The Loose Marble --And The Origins Of Operational Art, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol XIX, No. 1, (Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 1989), 87.

This writer contends the operational level of war and thus operational art is older than generally described in the Naval War College core curriculum material. The Athenian campaign to conquer Sicily meets all the criteria used to describe the relationship between levels of war. It linked Athenian national strategy with tactical operations on the sea and ground. The size of the forces, the complex command and control structure, long lines of communication, and the fact that the force operated in a joint environment far from their national leadership all lead one to believe it was indeed an early example of the operational level of war and operational art.

One could reasonably ask the relevance of the question of the origins of operational level of war and operational art. The understanding of the basic concepts of operational art is a fundamental goal of the Naval War College. Practitioners of the profession of arms limit themselves unnecessarily by thinking of the operational level of war as a recent development. There is a wealth of valuable information to be gained from the careful study of ancient campaigns. Doctrinal perspectives relating to complex situations faced by ancient city-states can offer lessons to today's professional military members. This paper will examine the Sicilian operation in detail from the perspective of practitioners of operational art and the operational level of warfare. It will attempt to show convincingly that this conflict meets all the modern criteria used to describe the operational level of warfare. A logical beginning is to discuss the Athenian national strategy and the stated objectives of the campaign.

POLIS-CITY/STATE STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES

This campaign occurred in the midst of an unusual period in the Peloponnesian War. Since 431 B.C. the Delian League under Athens had fought the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta. In the tenth year of the war an uneasy peace, called the "Peace of Nicias," existed.

Anything but peaceful, this period was marked by aggression on both sides, battles between allies, and diplomatic intrigue. Against this unstable strategic backdrop called by some the "phony peace," Athens began examining operational-level alternatives.[5]

Figure 1 - Athenian Area of Interest

Several possible motives exist to explain reasons for the Sicilian Expedition. Plausible reasons include economics and logistics, alliance requirements, and pre-emption of attack on Athens itself. With Attica vulnerable to Spartan raids, Athens depended entirely on imported grain for subsistence. The single Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) from the Black Sea along the eastern coast of Greece was vulnerable and developing alternative lines was prudent. Securing an alternative grain SLOC in case the Persians or Spartans cut the

[5] Peter Green, Armada from Athens, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970), 86.

SLOC to the Hellespont and the Black Sea is plausible. Another plausible reason is to aid fellow Ionians and allies in Sicily and thusly maintaining Athenian credibility with its allies in Greece. Envoys from Egesta asked for help from Athens in their violent disputes with Seluntine. Although treaty obligations were often played fast and loose by many polis-cities, going to the aid of their allies did shore up the Delian League. Athenians were also especially excited by Egesta, which argued that Syracuse was about to dominate the whole island and would then aid Corinth and Sparta against Athens. Their fears of attack from a united Sicily was serious enough that the Athenians opted to send a fact-finding mission both to see if Egesta had money to pay for an expedition and to estimate the threat to Egesta from Seluntine and Syracuse. Preventing an attack from Sicily, led by Syracuse, a Corinthian colony, once Syracuse had united the island under its control was another plausible motive.

Secure SLOCs, credibility, and preemption sound reasonable but may be mere pretext for the operation. Thucydides himself stresses that the Athenians were intent on conquering the whole island.[6] The force eventually sent was far more than necessary to secure a grain SLOC, since merely tilting the balance of power in Sicily in Athens' favor would have sufficed. Sparta's most outspoken ally, Corinth, could conceivably have been starved into submission. By controlling that grain SLOC, it is plausible that such power would also help Athens against Sparta, which imported none of its grain. Yet Athens' navy already controlled the Gulf of Corinth, so it is not clear why controlling Sicily was necessary to starve Corinth.[7] The picture Thucydides presents of Athens is of enthusiasm out of control. Athenians apparently counted on their treaty with Sparta to keep them safe from a Spartan attack in Attica. Ordinary citizens dreamed of "immortal pay" both from rowing back and

[6] Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides: The History of the Peloponnesian War, edited by Richard Schlatter, (Rutgers, University of New Jersey, 1975), 386.

forth between Athens and Sicily and from booty taken in the conquest of Syracuse. Young men who grew to manhood during the Peace of Nicias had been forced to endure years of seeing Athenian farms and vineyards ravaged by Spartan armies. Under Pericles' leadership they had to try to ignore Spartan taunts to come outside their high walls and fight like men.[8] Thucydides states they were overcome by an "erotic longing" for foreign sights and other adventures. Older citizens thought Athens safe because of the size of their fleet; and some, like Alcibiades, hoped to pay off debts and earn glory in the enterprise. The truth is probably a mix of all of these reasons. Proof of this are the objectives set by the two major public assemblies in Athens as the people voted to send the expedition.

The initial Assembly debated the issue and voted to send a relatively small expedition of sixty triremes under Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus. Their orders were (1) to help Egesta, (2) restore the Leontini, and (3) "order all matters in Sicily as they thought best for Athens."[9] The orders mix political and military authority in the generals who can decide on both policy and strategy. However mere days after this vote, the Assembly met again with much different results.

The second Assembly to address the Sicilian issue is famous for many reasons. Academicians from a variety of disciplines study the debates between the chief opponent of the enterprise, Nicias, and its most ardent supporter, Alcibiades. However interesting the process may be, it is the Assembly's outcome that is important to this particular study. The citizenry voted to expand the size of the force to nearly three times the size agreed upon in the initial assembly and added a substantial ground force. Although the exact wording in the

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[7] Dr. Karl Walling, Lecture Notes - Thucydides Book VI and VII, (Naval War College, 2 March 2004 n.p.) p3.
[8] Ibid. 3.
[9] Donald Kagan, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 172.

debates does not directly address conquering all of Sicily, Thucydides accounts for the change in the size as a clear indication of their intent to conquer the entire island.[10] Another indication is the meeting in late June of the ten Athenian generals to discuss "what disposition they should make of Sicilian affairs, if they should get control of the island."[11] Clearly the intent was to conquer the island if the opportunity presented itself. Examining the operational planning involved will show the complexity of the expedition and the arrangements necessary to implement it.



Figure 2 - Ancient Sicily

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The design of the operation was large scale by ancient standards. A joint force of as many as 27,810 men deployed with great fanfare from the Athenian port of Piraeus in early

[10] Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides: The History of the Peloponnesian War, edited by Richard Schlatter, (Rutgers, University of New Jersey, 1975), 361.
[11] Peter Green, Armada from Athens, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970), 118.

July 415 B.C.[12] Heavily armed hoplites or infantry, numbered roughly 4,400 with the remaining ground forces made up of a few cavalry and 1,300 slingers and archers. Naval forces of the marines and sailors of the 134 triremes in the fleet completed the joint force. This force was assembled in the two and one half months since the Assembly voted to approve the operation. It included allies from Rhodes, Crete, and Megara. These forces were divided into three large flotillas for the movement from Athens to Sicily. Each of the three commanders, Nicias, Lamachus, and Alcibiades, assumed direct control over a portion of the fleet after agreeing on detailed instructions of how and where the fleets were to anchor and camp for the nights. An advance guard set out to secure anchoring rights and establish markets for sailors and soldiers to buy food during the deployment.

Some modern writers scoff at the tripartite command structure, but more recent successful operational examples exist. During the German invasion of Norway in World War II, General Falkenhorst, Group XXI Commander, was "First among Equals" among the German flag officers involved in the operation.[13] Despite this unconventional command structure the Germans succeeded in conquering Norway and Denmark. The Athenian command structure made more sense if one takes into account the personalities and talents of the three commanders. Their personalities balanced one another despite the intense rivalry between two of the three. Nicias opposed the expedition while Alcibiades was its most passionate advocate. Both these men had numerous supporters in the Assembly and within the other elected generals and were quite politically astute. They were also opposites in the ages and dispositions. Their partner in command, Lamachus, was a solid, experienced commander of land and naval forces. Lamachus had demonstrated a predilection for bold

[12] Ibid, 130.

and decisive action, but with little political experience.[14] In the same manner in which Congress today can cause the U.S. military to do things that we would not do on our own, the Assembly seems to have deliberately chosen the commanders with balance, both in temperament and political factions in mind. One ancient historian, Plutarch, put it thusly, "Nicias, because of his experience, was looked upon as the fitter for the employment, and his wariness with the bravery of Alcibiades, and the easy temper of Lamachus, all compounded together promising such security but as to confirm the resolution."[15] The strategic desired endstate had been given to the commanders. It remained their task to move the forces into the theater and develop operational objectives to meet the strategic objective.

Sequencing any large complex operation is challenging. Such is true for the Athenian campaign in Sicily. The movement of forces into theater was complex and lengthy. The division of the force into three fleets lessened the span of control that the three commanders were most directly responsible. An advance party preceded the three fleets to arrange berthing and markets for the following forces. At this time the fleets typically stopped for the night to camp. They also generally individually bought food and other subsistence items from markets set up by city-states along the route.

Aside from the movement of forces into the area the three commanders had different concepts on subsequent operations. All identified the operational center of gravity for taking the entire island as the city/state of Syracuse. Interestingly enough their plans generally matched their characters. Nicias preferred to ease into the area of operations and conduct a

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[13] Earl F. Ziemke., The German Northern Theater Of Operations 1940-1945. (Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1959). p.17.
[14] Joe D. Dowdy, Joe D., The Syracuse Campaign: Failed Opportunities, Failed Leadership, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 10 April 2001), 18.
[15] Plutarch. PLUTARCH: The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans. (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 429.

large show of force. Alcibiades wanted to form a coalition of Sicilian cities and focus their attention on Athens largest and most potentially dangerous opponent, Syracuse. Lamachus advocated a direct approach to engage Syracuse immediately upon entering the joint area of operations. Due to the abrupt departure of Alcibiades, Nicias became more than equal in the once tripartite command. He effectively became the overall commander and the representative of the intent of the Athenian Assembly. That proved unfortunate for the Athenian force since Nicias was overly cautious and displayed hesitant tactics.[16]

Nicias did not focus his attention on Syracuse immediately upon arrival into the JOA. The Athenians never enjoyed strategic surprise nor did they probably expect it. In a sea-based economy such as Athens' the construction of such a large fleet and its intended destination could not have been concealed. Yet the Syracusians remained apparently in denial of their vulnerability and only after the forces arrived in Sicily did they belatedly take any preventative measures.[17] With respect to operational deception, it could be argued that Nicias did not attempt to employ any. Thucydides describes his hesitant actions in some detail. However, another argument could be made that Nicias did indeed use operational deception when he sailed only ten vessels into Syracuse's harbor and then concentrated the fleet and army north to Segestra where he conducted operations. If his object was to lure the Syracusians into a mood of rash overconfidence, it apparently worked north of Syracuse at Catana. Nicias planted false information with a known sympathizer and the Syracusians acted upon this lie. Nicias' forces caught them in a well-placed trap and annihilated a significant portion of their ground forces.[18] Records are inconclusive regarding Nicias' true intent. His critics attribute the delays in directly addressing Syracusian power as hesitancy.

[16] Ibid. 432.
[17] Peter Green, Armada from Athens, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970), 144.

Yet, his actions had the effect of luring his adversary's army outside their walled city and dealing them a heavy blow. One could argue that his actions were not hesitancy, but intended to keep the Syracusians off balance. Evidence of this more offensive mindset is the fact that Nicias immediately followed up the ground action by taking and securing several geographically important positions around Syracuse and began to lay siege to the city.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

Respected scholars contend that the operational level commander must arrange the operational factors of time, space, and force so that they collectively enhance his ability to act freely.[19] The same considerations applied to the Athenians as they planned and executed the Sicilian Operation. The following paragraphs will examine the operational factors and discuss how they applied to these ancient practitioners of operational art.

[18] Ibid. 162.
[19] Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare, Naval War College, NWC 1004, (Newport Naval Station, RI: 2000), 29.



Figure 3 - 5th Century B.C. North Eastern Mediterranean

The distance from Athens to Sicily is over five hundred nautical miles. It is even further if one must generally hug the coastline, as ancient trireme captains did. Athenian forces were far from the support of their allies and especially their home of Athens. The plan to establish a base at Rhegium failed to come to fruition after that city voted not to support the Athenian forces in fear of Syracusian reprisals. This was a bitter disappointment since Rhegium had been a long-standing ally and their lack of support lengthened the fleet's SLOCs. Over time their focus came to center on laying siege to Syracuse. As such, their lines were convergent in nature on that physical position. Their harbor was subject to relatively easy blockade due to its narrow entrance, especially with a fleet the size of Athens'.

The battlespace was more favorable to Syracuse in most features. They fought for their very lives in the area in which they lived. The city was in a central position relative to the points Nicias' forces could establish in the surrounding area. The shape of their harbor

could have been defended more aggressively to prevent Athenian landings. Conversely, that same feature favored an enemy blockade.

Time was not on Athens' side. The expedition sailed from Greece with a treasury with which to pay the hoplites, marines, and sailors. It was also used to buy general supplies and other necessities. It was, therefore, in Athens' interest to bring the operation to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible. Simply put, the longer the operation took the more it cost. The wear and tear of trireme use lessened their effectiveness over time. Unless they could regularly be beached for cleaning and repairs the wooden ships became less efficient. Somewhat like American democracy, the Athenian demos were impatient for successful operations. Additionally, Nicias received a letter from the Assembly urging action. Continuity of operations was not Nicias' strong point. Quick action to reinforce his victories could have increased the chances of Syracuse. The additional pressure, rather than seeming to back off, might have paid more dividends.

On the Syracusian side, overall time was favorable. The visual impact of a renowned Athenian fleet sailing through their harbor almost led to capitulation without a fight. Their democratically elected council came close to deciding not to resist. However, their resolve stiffened over time, especially after the arrival of the Spartan General, Gylippus. Their citizens' fears lessened as the Athenian forces did little more initially than display their force and move out of the area. Syracuse's defenses could be strengthened as long as Athens delayed combat operations. The successful completion of a siege wall cutting off Syracuse from reinforcement and supplies would have turned the tables on the factor of time, if Athens were to complete that task. However, since they failed for a number of reasons, time continued to work in Syracuse's favor.

The terrain near Syracuse proved generally favorable to ground force operations including the use of cavalry. Nearby plains were suitable for the large phalanx formations of heavy infantry of the time. The choices made by Nicias for landing troops and establishing bases of operation south of the city proved poor since their main base of operations was beside a swampy area and supplies had to be ferried across laboriously. Otherwise, the terrain favored operations by both opponents.

Athens' expedition of over 27,000 men was a mix of types of forces of the time that were dominated by their naval force. Many popular films could leave one the impression that the triremes were propelled by chained slaves rowing to the beat of a drum a la *Ben Hur*. In truth, one hundred-seventy professional rowers who received regular and substantial pay for their efforts manned each ship.[20] Bonuses were offered for specific successes. Similarly, the marines and hoplite infantry were generally volunteers who were well trained and paid for their service. Athens was known for the skill and expertise of their naval forces throughout the known world at that time. The greatest deficiency in types of forces experienced by Athens was with respect to cavalry. They initially sailed with cavalrymen and saddles, but no horses. This was no glaring oversight on their part. Horses were notoriously difficult to transport by sea. Nicias intended and eventually succeeded in acquiring mounts for his men and even reinforced his numbers as the operation progressed. Morale in this force was subject to the same conditions of leadership, perceived successes and failures, and support that our military is subjected to today. It rose and subsided over the course of the operation.

[20]Nicolle Hirschfeld, Appendix G - Trireme Warfare in Thucydides, edited by Robert B. Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides - A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. (New York, NY: Touchstone Books, Simon and Schuster, 1996), 610.

Syracuse's defense force was no match, man for man, for their experienced adversaries. Late to acknowledge the nature of the threat, they were slow to respond to Athens' advance into the theater, even to their very doorstep. Evidence suggests that Syracuse was not the threat to Athenian dominance in the Peloponnesian War that was portrayed in the Athenian Assembly debates. It was only under the leadership of the Spartan General, Gylippus, that they became an effective military force. Their naval force was small, but had the advantage of much local support. A lack of training and experience was their shortcoming. That weakness was more than adequately overcome as their defense continued. Syracusian ground forces had the same components of marine, hoplite, peltasts (lightly armed throwers), and cavalry. These forces were similarly inexperienced and ill trained.

Sparta, renowned for the skill of their army, came to Syracuse's aid with a single man whose presence made an enormous difference in the operational outcome. Spartan reputation alone made enemies cringe.[21] Even the announcement of Spartan reinforcements tipped the scales on a day that the Sryacusians seemed on the verge of surrendering. When the size of the reinforcements was seen to be ridiculously small, Gylippus' personality, military expertise, and leadership strength proved enough to convince them to continue the fight. Gylippus' contribution to the eventual Syracusian victory cannot be overemphasized. His use of all the tenets of operational leadership was superb.

COUNTERARGUMENTS

Despite the complexity of the operation, the linkage between strategy and tactics, and the scale of the forces involved some could argue that the Sicilian Expedition was not

characteristic of the operational level of war. Notes from the Naval War College's Joint Military Operations Department "Introduction to Operational Art" relate several points by which the emergence of the operational level of war is deemed to occur.[22] Political decisions and technological innovations drove the emergence of the operational level of war. Large complex battlefields impossible to control by a single individual and general officers operating beyond the range of the national level commander were thought to have materialized in the 19th and 20th centuries.

It is true that the number of technological innovations that came about in the Peloponnesian War were few. Naval warfare of the time did improve with the addition of more efficient triremes and some were equipped with newer methods for disabling enemy ships. These improvements did not result in significant changes in military operations. However the political decisions involved in sending an enormous expedition to Sicily were anything but simple. The tripartite command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus went forth with a clear strategic intent from the Athenian Assembly. Operating at a distance of more than five hundred miles with only intermittent communication with the civilian leadership it is clear they acted in accordance with a mutually understood commander's intent. It is clear from the written evidence that the expedition went forward with a somewhat flexible set of objectives. However, the commanders attempted to implement what Alcibiades later described as the "Grand Design." Circumstances did not permit their successful conclusion.

Some could point to the tendency for the key leaders involved in the conflict to directly involve themselves in the engagements as evidence that these were simply large

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[21] Donald Kagan, The Archidamian War. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 19.
[22] Naval War College, PowerPoint Briefing - Introduction to Operational Art, Joint Military Operations Department, Spring Semester 2004, p2.

tactical engagements. One of the three Athenian commanders, Lamachus, was killed in direct combat early in the conflict. Spartan General Gylippus personally led several engagements so the argument has some validity. However, closer examination of some of these engagements reveals that larger, more complex events were underway. For instance, Gylippus successfully executed a joint ground and naval engagement against Plemmyrium that required simultaneous operations by a Corinthian naval leader and Syracuse's ground forces.[23] Simultaneous execution of both naval and ground force operations was necessary for success in this engagement. There are other such examples on both Athenian and Syracusian sides that reinforce the complex nature of this operation and contribute to a conclusion that the Sicilian Operation did indeed link the strategic level of war with the tactical.

CONCLUSION

This paper focused on the origins of operational art and the operational level of war. Instructional material used in the Naval War College leads students to the conclusion that operational art and the operational level of war is a relatively recent development. This paper argues instead that the operational level of war is not a recent development in warfare, but one that has existed even in ancient times. This difference is not lost upon the faculty at the college. At least one instructor took time to point out during meetings that other ancient operations could reasonably meet the criteria for the operational level of war.[24] That

[23]Peter Green, Armada from Athens, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1970), 253.

[24] Professor Hugh Lynch, Seminar Lecture: "Introduction to Operational Art," Naval War College Course 2004. Joint Military Operations Department. 19 March 2004.

advantage is lost upon distance-learning students who only have course materials from which to draw information.[25]

Therefore the operational level of war is older than described in the Naval War College course material. The Athenian campaign during the Peloponnesian War to conquer Sicily meets all the criteria used to describe the relationship between levels of war. It linked Athenian national strategy with tactical operations on the sea and ground. The size of the forces, the complex command and control structure, long lines of communication, and the fact that the force operated in a joint environment far from their national leadership all lead one to believe it was indeed an early example of the operational level of war and operational art. Practitioners of military art and science and those who study operational art can benefit from closely examining ancient conflicts. The Peloponnesian War is but one of many ancient confrontations that may offer a better understanding of warfare and contribute to successful future operations for our nation.

[25] Naval War College, Block 1.4 Introduction to Operational Art, OPART Doctrine, and Levels of War, College of Distant Education, AY 2004-2005.

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